"Congress shall make no law. . . abdidging the Freedom of Speech, or of the Press . . ."
Last week the Supreme Court issued its long-anticipated decision in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission. Thankfully, the Court "got it right." In particular, the Court overruled Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, a decision that had sustained, for the first time, a ban on core political speech simply because the speaking entity was a corporation, that is, a voluntary association of individuals.
In the fall, your not-so-humble blogger argued that Austin was incorrect, because the distinction it drew between corporations and other entities or, for that matter, natural persons, did not withstand analysis. Among other things this Blog said:
"Third, there is no good reason for treating corporations, large or small, any differently from Ross Perot or Bill Gates, both of whom earned most of their wealth from . . . corporations!Corporations are legal fictions, just like "partnerships," "sole proprietorships," "limited liability companies," "labor unions," "non profit corporations," etc. Behind these fictions are actual human beings who contribute labor, capital, know how, etc. to a joint enterprise. Corporations, like other forms of business organization, are best understood as a "nexus of contracts" between various categories of individuals that supply inputs to a joint enterprise. Where corporations are concerned, such suppliers include shareholders, debtholders, managers, employees, directors and others. Hopefully such enterprises earn enough to pay off lenders, pay handsome wages and salaries, and earn a profit. In the case of a corporation, some of the profits are paid out as dividends, some are reinvested in new projects, and some remain in the corporate treasury, for future use at the discretion of management."
The post also rejected the claim that corporations receive "special privileges from the state" that justify regulation not imposed on other actors, as well as the so-called "shareholder protection rationale" for banning corporate speech:
"Fifth, there are two counterarguments to the pro-speech approach that I have just sketched. First, that corporations receive "special privileges" from the state that justify additional state regulation, privileges such as perpetual life, entity status, and limited liability. Each such privilege, it is said, facilitates the creation of wealth in the economic marketplace that corporations might improperly transfer into the political arena, by spending resources on speech that exceeds the "actual public support" for the ideas expressed. Second, that shareholders need protection from managers who will use "their" (shareholders') money to speak about candidates the managers support, whether or not shareholders support them.
The Supreme Court bought the first argument in Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1991). Justice Brennan, in a concurrence, bought the second argument, analogizing corporate speech to a "theft" of shareholder assets to support viewpoints with which shareholders might disagree. Neither argument withstands scrutiny, in my view.
Many corporations, even large ones, are quite young. (Microsoft is ten years younger than I am.) Still, bans on corporate political speech apply "across the board," regardless of the age of the firm. Hence, the "perpetual life" attribute does not justify the current scope of speech regulation. Moreover, limited liability limits the liability of shareholders, not corporations (who are fully liable for their own torts or contract breaches despite limited liability), and it's a bit odd to invoke a benefit granted to individuals to justify disadvantaging corporations. (Moreover, corporations often "pay" for limited liability because they must pay higher interest rates to compensate voluntary creditors for the latter's inability to access shareholder assets if the corporation is judgment proof.)
To be sure, limited liability, perpetual life, entity status, etc. all facilitate the separation of ownership from control in large public corporations and thereby facilitate the creation and retention of wealth. (An investor is far more likely to purchase shares in a corporation if he or she knows that he or she can only lose the amount invested, without putting personal assets at risk.) Still, lots of background rules, whether contract law, tort law, partnership law, agency law, property law, trademark law, the law of secured transactions, etc., facilitate the creation and retention of wealth by individuals --- where would a franchise be without the state action necessary to enforce a trademark --- but we don't therefore conclude that individuals have received "special benefits from the state" that justify additional limits on their speech. Nor would we, for instance, allow the state to squelch speech by individuals to whom it had guaranteed a minimum income, even if the state argued that it was merely preventing the recipients of state largesse from using that largesse, or the leisure made possible by subsidies from others, to distort the political marketplace. Here again, there is no reason to distinguish individuals from corporations.
Moreover, most industries are characterized by free entry, so there is no reason to believe that the special nature of the corporate form generally allows firms to earn above-average returns, because such returns would just attract additional competition from other corporations. Finally, unless I am mistaken, bans on corporate speech are not reserved for large corporations, but apply even to corporations that are much smaller than many partnerships, for instance. Thus, even taken on their own (unpersuasive) terms, such bans are not narrowly tailored to further their purported interest.
What, though, about the "shareholder protection rationale?" Proponents of this approach argue that, if shareholders want to support a candidate, they can contribute to special funds that then spend the money on speech as directed by the corporation. Under this approach, Justice Brennan said, speech reflects "actual support" for the views expressed. This is mere wordplay. Such speech reflects some actual support, yes, but not the full actual support. As Roberto Romano argued before Austin, reliance upon separate funds is beset by collective action problems. One shareholder's contribution benefits all shareholders, even those who don't contribute. The result will be free riding by some shareholders on the contributions made by others and thus suboptimal expenditures on speech. Such a burden is not justified by any effort to protect shareholders, who have voluntarily agreed to participate in an enterprise that uses retained earnings to speak. Perhaps states could adopt heightened scrutiny of speech to make sure such speech furthers a firm's interest, but an outright ban, relegating shareholders to suboptimal separate funds, sweeps too far and offends the First Amendment, in my view. For an elaboration of this rebuttal of the shareholder protection argument, see Alan J. Meese, Limitations on Corporate Speech: Protection of Shareholders or Abridgement of Expression, 2 W&M Bill of Rights Journal 305 (1993) (See here)."
The Supreme Court bought the first argument in Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1991). Justice Brennan, in a concurrence, bought the second argument, analogizing corporate speech to a "theft" of shareholder assets to support viewpoints with which shareholders might disagree. Neither argument withstands scrutiny, in my view.
Many corporations, even large ones, are quite young. (Microsoft is ten years younger than I am.) Still, bans on corporate political speech apply "across the board," regardless of the age of the firm. Hence, the "perpetual life" attribute does not justify the current scope of speech regulation. Moreover, limited liability limits the liability of shareholders, not corporations (who are fully liable for their own torts or contract breaches despite limited liability), and it's a bit odd to invoke a benefit granted to individuals to justify disadvantaging corporations. (Moreover, corporations often "pay" for limited liability because they must pay higher interest rates to compensate voluntary creditors for the latter's inability to access shareholder assets if the corporation is judgment proof.)
To be sure, limited liability, perpetual life, entity status, etc. all facilitate the separation of ownership from control in large public corporations and thereby facilitate the creation and retention of wealth. (An investor is far more likely to purchase shares in a corporation if he or she knows that he or she can only lose the amount invested, without putting personal assets at risk.) Still, lots of background rules, whether contract law, tort law, partnership law, agency law, property law, trademark law, the law of secured transactions, etc., facilitate the creation and retention of wealth by individuals --- where would a franchise be without the state action necessary to enforce a trademark --- but we don't therefore conclude that individuals have received "special benefits from the state" that justify additional limits on their speech. Nor would we, for instance, allow the state to squelch speech by individuals to whom it had guaranteed a minimum income, even if the state argued that it was merely preventing the recipients of state largesse from using that largesse, or the leisure made possible by subsidies from others, to distort the political marketplace. Here again, there is no reason to distinguish individuals from corporations.
Moreover, most industries are characterized by free entry, so there is no reason to believe that the special nature of the corporate form generally allows firms to earn above-average returns, because such returns would just attract additional competition from other corporations. Finally, unless I am mistaken, bans on corporate speech are not reserved for large corporations, but apply even to corporations that are much smaller than many partnerships, for instance. Thus, even taken on their own (unpersuasive) terms, such bans are not narrowly tailored to further their purported interest.
What, though, about the "shareholder protection rationale?" Proponents of this approach argue that, if shareholders want to support a candidate, they can contribute to special funds that then spend the money on speech as directed by the corporation. Under this approach, Justice Brennan said, speech reflects "actual support" for the views expressed. This is mere wordplay. Such speech reflects some actual support, yes, but not the full actual support. As Roberto Romano argued before Austin, reliance upon separate funds is beset by collective action problems. One shareholder's contribution benefits all shareholders, even those who don't contribute. The result will be free riding by some shareholders on the contributions made by others and thus suboptimal expenditures on speech. Such a burden is not justified by any effort to protect shareholders, who have voluntarily agreed to participate in an enterprise that uses retained earnings to speak. Perhaps states could adopt heightened scrutiny of speech to make sure such speech furthers a firm's interest, but an outright ban, relegating shareholders to suboptimal separate funds, sweeps too far and offends the First Amendment, in my view. For an elaboration of this rebuttal of the shareholder protection argument, see Alan J. Meese, Limitations on Corporate Speech: Protection of Shareholders or Abridgement of Expression, 2 W&M Bill of Rights Journal 305 (1993) (See here)."
The full post appears here:
Several scholars have agreed with the decision to overrule Austin, in some cases touching on themes similar to those invoked here in the fall.
For instance, over at the Volokh Conspiracy, Professor Ilya Somin rejects the argument that "people acting through corporations [should] be denied constitutional rights because corporations are 'state-created entities.'" Professor Somin's post makes very good reading.
Moreover, Professor Stephen Bainbridge, on his own blog, describes what he calls "[Justice] Stevens' pernicious view of the concession theory" that purports to justify regulation of corporations.
Also, Eugene Volokh rebuts those who claim that speech by a corporation is "money, not speech." As Volokh points out, exercising various constitutional rights costs money, and this common sense fact does not thereby undermine the importance of the right or somehow confer upon Congress or the states extra authority to ban core political speech. For instance, if the Constitution protects a right to abortion, and Congress banned spending money on abortions, pro-choice advocates would not stand idly by and say "no problem; the law merely bans spending."
More later, I'm sure . . . .
