Sixty four years ago today the German Navy scuttled the Graf Spee off the coast of Montevideo, Uruguay.  Though often dubbed a "pocket battleship" because of her 11 inch guns, the 16,000 ton Graf Spee, while larger than a heavy cruiser, was only one third the size of battleships such as the HMS Hood (47,000 tons) and German battleship Bismarck (50,000 tons).  After the outbreak of World War II, the ship sank several merchant vessels in the South Atlantic, and Great Britain responded by deploying nine different squadrons of ships in search of the raider.   On December 13, 1939, a British squadron consisting of one heavy cruiser (Exeter) and two light cruisers (Achilles and Ajax), intercepted the ship off the coast of Uruguay.  The German warship moved south toward the British squadron at full speed, and opened fire while still beyond the range of its adversaries.   The larger Exeter moved northwest, drawing a portion of Graf Spee's fire, while the two smaller cruisers moved to the northeast.  See Winston Churchill, The Second World War: Vol. I: The Gathering Storm, 521-22  (1948) (producing five diagrams detailing various phases of the battle).  Battered by several 11 inch shells, the Exeter withdrew, after scoring several hits of her own.   Damaged and still harried by the Ajax and Achilles, the Graf Spee made smoke and sought refuge in port of Montevideo. 

 

Once in port, the German vessel sought two weeks to make repairs.  However, British diplomats invoked the 1907 Hague Convention Concerning the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers in Naval War, to which Uruguay was a signatory.  Article XII of the Convention required belligerent ships to depart from a neutral port within 24 hours of entry.  British diplomats initially invoked this article in an effort to force Uruguay immediately to expel the German raider.  However, the British Admiralty had dispatched the heavy cruiser Cumberland to join the Ajax and Achilles, and additional vessels were scheduled to arrive on December 19.  As a result, the British invoked Article XVI of the convention, which prohibited a belligerent ship from leaving a neutral port less than 24 hours after a ship from a different belligerent.  British and French merchant vessels began departing in 24 hour intervals, thereby delaying any possible departure by the German vessel.  Anticipating that the injured vessel would soon be hopelessly outnumbered and outgunned, a skeleton crew sailed the Graf Spee out to sea and scuttled her, as pictured above.

Is our Navy Too Small?

Not a Ship, But Can Sink One

Ditto 

 Victim of  Land-Based Bombers

Over at the "Monkey Cage," Political Scientists Brian Crisher and Mark Souva have published a guest post evaluating Governor Romney's claim, made during the third and final Presidential debate, that projected defense cuts will leave America with a dangerously small navy of fewer than 300 ships, smaller than any time since 1916.  (Some will recall that Congressman Ryan made a similar claim during the Vice Presidential debate.)  Crisher and Souva invoke a paper they have co-authored, which measures the relative strength of various national navies during the 19th, 20th and early 21st centuries.  As they put it:

"In 1916, the US controlled roughly 11% of the world’s naval power. This is an impressive number that ranks the US third in naval strength behind the UK (34%) and Germany (19%), and just ahead of France (10%). What about the US navy in 2011? In 2011, the US controlled roughly 50% of the world’s naval power putting it in a comfortable lead in naval power ahead of Russia (11%).

The US Navy has decreased in absolute size as Governor Romney argues (although this decline has been ongoing since the end of Cold War). U.S. warships are more powerful now than in the past, as President Obama implied. However, neither the number of warships nor the power of our ships is what is most important for understanding military and political influence. It is relative military power that matters most. In this respect, the U.S. navy is far stronger now than in 1916."

In so arguing, Crisher and Souva echo similar but less scholarly arguments to the effect that the modern U.S. Navy could defeat the U.S. Navy of 1917, with the result that the size of the modern Navy is beside the point.

This analysis is incomplete, to say the least.   For one thing, the fact that our modern navy could defeat the navy of 1917 is irrelevant and "proves too much."  After all, a single modern U.S. Aircraft carrier could defeat the Navy of 1917.  Does that mean one such ship would suffice for our current needs?  Of course not.

Moreover, comparing the size and composition of different navies is a good start, but it's only a start.   One also has to define our Navy's mission and determine what non-naval capabilities our potential adversaries possess that might thwart that mission.  Three examples --- two historical and one current --- help make this point.

1.  In 1940, the British Navy was far superior to that of Germany.  In 1840, such naval superiority would have prevented any invasion of Britain.  It did not in 1940.  Why?  Because Germany had a large and effective air force capable of sinking any British vessels that ventured into the English Channel.  Only the British Air Force, combined with the "untested" tool of radar, prevented Germany from gaining air superiority over the Channel and thus executing "Operation Sea Lion," Hitler's plan to invade and conquer Britain.     In short, a comparison between the British and German Navies in 1940, while important, ultimately provided a misleading assessment of the balance of power between the two countries.

2.  During the 1980s, the U.S. Navy was tasked with maintaining open sea lanes between the continental USA and Europe, so as to facilitate the re-supply of Europe in the event of a Soviet invasion.   Crisher and Souva conclude that the U.S. navy, built around more than a dozen aircraft carriers at the time, was more than a match for the Soviet navy, including the Soviet submarine fleet, during this period.  Probably so.   However, the Soviet surface and submarine fleet was not the only threat to American carriers during this era.  Instead, the Soviets deployed hundreds of land-based bombers, such as the TU-22M Backfire (pictured above), each carrying anti-ship cruise missiles with a range of several hundred miles and designed to destroy aircraft carriers, their escorts, and, ultimately, troop ships.  (Those who have read Tom Clancy's "Red Storm Rising" will recall how TU-22M's devastated a joint French-American convoy early in that fictitious war.)  Thus, even if the U.S. Navy could have sunk each and every Soviet surface ship and submarine in the Atlantic Ocean, it might still have failed in its objective to maintain open sea lanes between the U.S. and Europe.  The British learned this type of lesson the hard way when, on December 10, 1941, Japanese land-based bombers sank the battleship HMS Prince of Wales (pictured above) as well as the battlecruiser Repulse.

3.   The U.S. Navy is currently tasked with the possible defense of Taiwan in the unlikely event of a forcible invasion of that island.  Indeed, during his Presidency, Bill Clinton ordered the U.S.S. Nimitz to sail through the Taiwan Straits to demonstrate American resolve.  No one doubts that the U.S. Navy is vastly superior to any other navy in the world at this moment in history.   However, China has other military capabilities that could thwart the U.S. Navy's ability to perform its assigned mission.   For instance, as previously discussed on this blog (see also here), China has developed and deployed an intermediate range ballistic missile designed to strike large ships such as aircraft carriers from over 1,000 miles away.  Indeed, according to one source, China has produced 80 such DF-21 "carrier killer" missiles, which are also capable of striking U.S. bases in the region, along with other missiles.  Moreover, China deploys a large air force, including hundreds of H-6 bombers modeled on the Soviet TU-16 Badger.  Like the Badger, the H-6 can be armed with anti-ship cruise missiles.  Moreover, Russia has recently agreed to license the production of TU-22Ms to China, which plans to produce 36 such planes in its first production run.  In short, in addition to its growing navy, China has numerous land-based assets that could make a U.S. defense of Taiwan quite difficult.

To be sure, the fact that a navy cannot perform the mission assigned to it "on its own" does not thereby establish that the Navy is too small.  Doubling the size of the British Navy in 1940 would not have prevented a German invasion, unless, perhaps, the increase took the form of more aircraft carriers.  Instead, Britain needed more land-based Hurricanes, Spitfires and the pilots to fly them.  However, in some cases, only a navy can "do the job" required.  For instance, during the 1980s, land-based air power could not have fully countered the threat to our shipping from Soviet bombers and submarines, with the result that only aircraft carrier, defended by escorts, could do the job.  In the same way, a robust naval presence in the Pacific, for instance, may be the only way this nation can accomplish its objectives.

Sink the Bismarck: Fact and Fiction

Forgotten By Cinema

71 years ago today, the British Navy sank the German Battleship Bismarck,   Three days earlier, in the Battle of the Denmark Strait, the Bismarck had sunk the British Battlecruiser HMS Hood and damaged the Battleship HMS Prince of Wales while attempting to break out into the Atlantic.  The Prince of Wales had itself scored a few hits on the Bismarck, which began to trail oil, and the latter changed course for Brest, in Nazi-occupied France. 

The film Sink the Bismarck (1960) portrays British efforts to prevent Germany's finest battleship from reaching the Atlantic and raiding British convoys.  The film, one of this blogger's favorite war movies, departs from the actual historical record in several ways worthy of note on this anniversary.

1.  In the film, both the Hood and the Prince of Wales open fire on the Bismarck at the outset of the Battle of the Denmark Strait.  In fact, the Hood initially targeted the heavy cruiser Prince Eugen, which it mistook for the Bismarck, firing at least six salvos at the cruiser before realizing its error.  (By contrast, the Price of Wales correctly directed its fire at the Bismarck from the outset, scoring a hit before the Hood redirected its fire.)  By the time the Hood realized its error, the Bismarck and Price Eugen had already found the range and begun scoring hits on the Hood. Bismarck's fifth salvo struck the fatal blow to the Hood.  (See Zetterling and Tamelander, Bismarck: The Final Days of Germany's Greatest Battleship, 163-71 (2009).  We can only speculate what would have happened if the Hood had targetted the Bismarck, a larger target than the Prinz Eugen, at the outset of the battle.

2. In the film, the British heavy cruisers Norfolk and Suffolk continue to shadow the Bismarck after the Battle of the Denmark Strait, until the Bismarck evades the pursuers and steers toward Brest.  The Norfolk and Suffolk did shadow the Bismarck as depicted, but they did not do so alone. Instead, the battleship Prince of Wales, although damaged in the Denmark Strait, accompanied the two cruisers in the continued pursuit.  Indeed, the Bismarck and the Prince of Wales exchanged fire for several minutes on the evening of May 24, with neither ship scoring a hit.  Eventually the Prince of Wales and Suffolk broke off pursuit and sailed for Iceland to refuel.  (See Zetterling and Tamelander, Bismarck: The Final Days of Germany's Greatest Battleship183-85, 196-97 and 233.)

3.   The film portrays the destruction of a Swordfish torpedo plane by the Bismarck's anti-aircraft fire during the first attack on the Bismarck by planes from the aircraft carrier Victorious.  In fact, the Bismarck did not shoot down any British planes.

4.  The film depicts a torpedo attack on the Bismarck by several British destroyers, one of which the Bismarck sinks shortly after the attack.  Several British and one Polish destroyer did launch torpedoes at the Bismarck during the night of the May 26th and the very early morning of May 27th.  Moreover, the Bismarck did fire on several of these destroyers and exchanged fire with one of them --- the Polish destroyer Piorun.  However, the Bismarck did not score any hits.  (See  Zetterling and Tamelander, Final Days, at 251-56.)

5.   Late in the film, Admiral Lutjens expresses hope that, once in Brest, the Bismarck could put to sea with the pocket battleships Scharnhorst and Gneisnau and together raid British convoys.  The scene implies that this is a new idea    In fact, the initial plan for the operation called for the two pocket battleships to sortie at the same time as Bismarck and Prinz Eugen.  However, Scharnhorst required extensive repairs after returning from a previous sortie with Gneisenau (led by Lutjens), and an attack by British torpedo planes had damaged Gneisnau.   Thus, Bismarck and Prinz Eugen had to sortie alone in search of convoys.  (See Zetterling and Tamelander, Final Days, at  82-86.)

6.   The film's portrayal of the final engagement between the British and the Bismarck departs from the actual events in several respects.  For instance, in the film the Bismarck opens fire first.  Moreover, the British Battleship King George V, flagship of the British Home Fleet, is the first to open fire in return and scores a hit on the second or third salvo.  In fact, the British Battleship Rodney (pictured above), performing escort duty and on her way to Boston for an overhaul, opened the final attack on the Bismarck, at 8:47 AM, shortly before the King George V itself opened fire.  (See Zetterling and Tamelander, Final Days, at 265-69)  The Bismarck answered three minutes later. (See id.)  Moreover, while Zetterling and Tamelander are ambiguous on this point, some sources report that Rodney struck the first blow, at 9:02 AM.  (It should be noted that the film does mention the diversion of the Rodney to intercept the Bismarck several scenes before the final engagement.)   Finally, while the King George V witnesses the Bismarck sinking in the film, the Bismarck did not in fact sink until both British Battleships, low on fuel, had left the scene and headed for Scapa Flow.  (See Zetterling and Tamelander, Final Days, at 280.)  The heavy cruiser HMS Dorchester, which had joined in pummeling the Bismarck with her eight inch guns, fired several torpedoes into the Bismarck after the British battleships departed.  (In the film, the Dorchestire joins the King George V at the end of the engagement and launches her torpedoes in full view of the British battleship.)