Will Georgia Reject Liberty for Tesla (and Consumers)?

Protecting Economic Liberty

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The nation's automobile dealers are at it again, attempting to thwart basic economic freedoms in a manner that protects themselves, and their manufacturers, from fair competition.  The battleground this time is Georgia, where the state's automobile dealers' association has filed a petition seeking to bar Tesla from selling automobiles in the Peach State to willing purchasers from outlets owned by Tesla.  The petition claims that Tesla, which holds an automobile dealership license in Georgia, has violated the state's Automotive Franchising Law by selling automobiles to willing consumers from a single Tesla-owned retail store.  That law makes it unlawful for any automobile manufacturer to:

"own, operate, or control, directly or indirectly, more than a 45 percent interest in a dealer or dealership in this state[.]"

Just last week, Tesla filed a motion to dismiss the dealers' anti-liberty complaint. (See here, for a report about Tesla's filing).  Hopefully the Georgia courts will look north for guidance on how to rule on Tesla's motion.  Earlier this fall, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts struck a blow for economic liberty and the welfare of consumers, by rejected a similar petition by automobile dealers demanding coercive economic protection.  See Massachusetts State Automobile Dealers' Association et al. v. Tesla Motors, MA, Inc. and Tesla Motors, Inc.   As in Georgia, the plaintiffs, an association of automobile dealers and an individual dealer, claimed that Tesla's direct sales to willing consumers violated Massachusetts' own statute governing automotive franchising, General Law Chapter 93B, entitled: "Regulation of Business Practices Between Motor Vehicle Manufacturers, Distributors and Dealers."

Section 3 of chapter 93B prohibits what it calls "Unfair Methods of Competition and Unfair or Deceptive Acts of Practices."  Section 4 in turn defines various practices that violate Section 3. Section 4(c)(10) provides that it shall be a violation of Section 3 for:

"a manufacturer, distributor or franchiser representative to . . . own or operate, either directly or indirectly through any subsidiary, parent company or firm, a motor vehicle dealership located in the commonwealth of the same line [or]  make as any of the vehicles manufactured, assembled or distributed by the manufacturer or distributor.”

Tesla obviously manufactures automobiles, and it distributes such vehicles in Massachusetts via Tesla Motors of Massachusetts, a wholly-owned subsidiary.  Nonetheless, the Supreme Judicial Court concluded that the legislature did not mean to protect the state's dealers from competition by unrelated manufacturers.  Instead, the court said: "93B is aimed primarily at protecting motor vehicle dealers from injury caused by the unfair business practices of manufacturers and distributors with which they are associated, generally in a franchise relationship."  In other words, if a manufacturer, say Ford, relies on independent dealers to distribute its vehicles, it may not then open its own dealerships that compete with such dealers.  On the other hand, a manufacturer such as Tesla that only engages in self-distribution is perfectly free to do so, even if the resulting sales reduce the profits of established manufacturers and their dealers.  As the court put things later in the opinion:

Chapter 93B "was intended and understood only to prohibit manufacturer-owned dealerships when, unlike Tesla, the manufacturer already had an affiliated dealer or dealers in Massachusetts."

While the court couched its ultimate holding as resting upon the plaintiff's lack of standing, the opinion's rationale also suggests that Tesla's self-distribution does not violate the statute in the first place.  If so, then a party that did have standing to challenge a purported violation would nonetheless lose any challenge to Tesla's practice on the merits.

Of course, the ruling by the Supreme Judicial Court is not binding on Georgia courts interpreting their own statutes.  Moreover, the operative language of the Georgia statute is somewhat different from that of the Massachusetts statute.  Still, both statutes govern the franchising relationship between manufacturers and existing independent dealers.  Moreover, both statutes ban numerous practices that manufacturers might employ to the detriment of such independent dealers.  Read as a whole, then, neither statute seems designed to govern manufacturers that, like Tesla, have no independent dealers whatsoever.  Perhaps the Georgia courts will recognize this apparent function of the statute and reiterate the Massachusetts approach.  Failure to do so would place red-state Georgia in the embarrassing position of rejecting a form of economic liberty recognized in blue-state Massachusetts, an a potentially ironic twist given credible rankings finding that Massachusetts otherwise lags far behind Georgia when it comes to protecting basic economic freedoms.

Even if courts in both states embrace a pro-liberty position, the respective state legislatures are still perfectly free to amend their statutes so as to abridge basic economic liberty by banning self-distribution by firms like Tesla.  Indeed, less than a year ago, and as reported here, a member of the Massachusetts legislature introduced a bill intended to "clarify" Chapter 93B. The bill included the following language that would have banned Tesla's strategy of self-distribution.

"The blanket prohibition on manufacturer ownership applies notwithstanding whether a manufacturer has used independently owned or operated dealerships to distribute its vehicles."

Hopefully both legislatures will resist any temptation to alter their statutes in this way.  As previously explained on this blog, free societies respect the rights of entrepreneurs to distribute products as they see fit, so long as the method chosen does not impose inefficient harms on third parties.    Like some other manufacturers, Tesla has chosen to rely upon complete vertical integration, a practice that can reduce the transaction costs that sometimes result from reliance upon independent dealers. While such dealers can provide valuable services, some consumers choose to forgo such services and purchase directly from the manufacturer.  Proponents of legislation imposing blanket bans on such vertical integration by automobile manufacturers have offered no plausible account of how integration by modestly-sized firms such as Tesla can produce economic harm. (See here, discussing and refuting arguments in favor of such a ban.)  Thus, some commentators have properly concluded that statutes banning Tesla's self-distribution "reduce competition in [the state's] automobile market for the benefit of its auto dealers and to the detriment of its consumers."  As a result, they conclude, such statutes amount to "protectionism for auto dealers, pure and simple." Such protectionism, of course, also raises barriers to entry for firms such as Telsa, who apparently believe that self-distribution is less costly than reliance upon independent dealers.  A state anxious to maximize the liberty and welfare of its citizens will reject such coercive protectionism.

New Jersey v. Economic Liberty

Praised Vertical Integration; Won Nobel Prize 

Thinks It Knows Better

A free society allows its citizens to engage in voluntary commercial exchange, so long as such exchange does not impose economic harm on unconsenting third parties.    Unfortunately the State of New Jersey takes a different view.  Last month the Garden State's Motor Vehicle Commission announced that Tesla Motors may only sell its cars in New Jersey via franchised automobile dealers.  (See this story in the New Jersey Star-Ledger describing the new rule).  The rule effectively bans Tesla's strategy of forward vertical integration.  Pursuant to this strategy, the firm operates two company-owned show rooms in the state, thereby "eliminating the middleman" and taking direct responsibility for explaining the virtues, limitations and prices of its products   Such vertical integration is a widespread practice, to say the very least. 

For the first several decades of the 20th Century, economists were hostile to most vertical integration, preferring the more fragmented market structure endorsed by New Jersey.  Indeed, as previously explained on this blog,

"[Early in the 20th Century] economists identified two, and only two, possible reasons for complete vertical integration. First, such integration could create technological efficiencies and thus reduce production costs. Second, integration could foreclose rivals from important sources of inputs, thereby creating or fortifying the integrating party's market power.  Thus, when economists, or, for that matter, antitrust courts or enforcement agencies, could not identify any efficiency purposes for such integration, they naturally inferred that the conduct was anticompetitive."

However, as Ronald Coase (pictured above) explained long ago, such vertical integration can produce other, non-technological benefits as well.  In particular, such integration can eliminate the costs of relying upon more decentralized markets, that is, "transacting," to conduct economic activity.  Such "transaction costs" can take many forms, including the risk that one's trading partner will engage in opportunistic behavior.  Indeed, Tesla recently asserted that franchised automobile dealers have a vested interest in promoting the sales of gasoline-powered automobiles over electric powered vehicles like Tesla's, with the result that reliance upon a system of franchised retailers will result in under-promotion of Teslas.

To be sure, franchised dealers can provide valuable services to consumers both before and after the purchase of a new or used automobile.   It is thus no surprise that many consumers prefer to purchase automobiles from such dealers instead of from other individuals or from Tesla.  However, such services are not free.  Instead, dealers quite properly pass along the costs of such services to consumers by marking up the price of the vehicle sold.   Apparently Tesla and some consumers believe that these additional services are not worth the additional price, leading both to embrace a different method of distribution.

As previously explained on this blog when discussing a (failed) effort in North Carolina to impose similar limits, free societies respect the rights of entrepreneurs and consumers to make such choices absent any apparent harm to third parties.  Moreover, given Telsa' tiny share of the automobile market there is no plausible risk that such integration is an anticompetitive tactic designed to gain or maintain market power.  It thus makes sense to interpret Tesla's innovative approach to marketing as an effort to minimize the cost distribution, a result that would enhance Tesla's welfare and the welfare of the consumers it serves.    Tesla's appraisal of the relative costs and benefits of relying upon its own show rooms instead of independent dealers may turn out to be incorrect, but free societies leave such decisions to firms and consumers, without coercive paternalistic intervention by state legislatures.  (See also this excellent discussion by Daniel Crane, on the Truth on the Market Blog last summer, that makes some similar points.)

Nonetheless, some continue to claim that such interference with basic economic freedoms serves legitimate purposes.  For instance, a recent story in CNN Money cites unnamed "advocates of the law" saying it aims "to encourage price competition and ensure customers have access to warranty and recall services."    Last week, 70 economists and law professors, including this blogger, signed a letter condemning the ban on Tesla's direct distribution.  The letter expressly considers the various rationales that proponents of the legislation have proffered and concludes, quite properly, that:

"We have not heard a single argument for a direct distribution ban that makes any sense.  To the contrary, these arguments simply bolster our belief that the regulations in question are motivated by economic protectionism that favors dealers at the expense of consumers and innovative technologies."

I should add that banning Tesla's preferred method of distribution may also protect other manufacturers of automobiles, by forcing Tesla to employ a more expensive and less effective method of distribution and thus discouraging procompetitive entry into the New Jersey market.  If so,  the ban may produce even more harm than initially supposed. 

Hopefully New Jersey will rethink  this unjustified interference with basic economic liberty.

Some Thoughts on the Legacy of Ronald Coase

 

Taught Us Why Firms Exist, And Much More

 

 

Earlier this week Ronald Coase passed away at 102.  Coase was the Clinton R. Musser Professor of Economics Emeritus at the University of Chicago Law School.   The University of Chicago has published an obituary here.

In 1991, Coase won the Nobel Prize in Economic Science.  The statement by the Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences that accompanied the award credited Coase with a "Breakthrough in Understanding the Institutional Structure of the Economy."   The Academy explained the "breakthrough" as follows:

"By means of a radical extension of economic micro theory, Ronald Coase succeeded in specifying principles for explaining the institutional structure of the economy, thereby also making new contributions to our understanding of the way the economy functions.  . . . .  Coase showed that traditional basic microeconomic theory was incomplete because it only included production and transport costs, whereas it neglected the costs of entering into and executing contracts and managing organizations. Such costs are commonly known as transaction costs and they account for a considerable share of the total use of resources in the economy. Thus, traditional theory had not embodied all of the restrictions which bind the allocations of economic agents. When transaction costs are taken into account, it turns out that the existence of firms, different corporate forms, variations in contract arrangements, the structure of the financial system and even fundamental features of the legal system can be given relatively simple explanations. By incorporating different types of transaction costs, Coase paved the way for a systematic analysis of institutions in the economic system and their significance." 

 

The core of Coase's contributions can be found in two articles:  The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. Law and Economics 1 (1960) and The Nature of the Firm, 4 Economica (n.s.) 381 (1937).  Coase summarized and restated these contributions in his Nobel Lecture, The Institutional Structure of Production, 82 American Economic Review 713 (1992).

 In "The Nature of the Firm," Coase began by noting that a competitive, decentralized market economy "worked itself," without any central direction.  Despite this fact, much economic activity occurs within firms which, as Coase noted, involve a significant amount of planning.  For instance, owners do not make repeated daily or hourly bargains with employees about what tasks employees should perform, but instead simply direct them to perform this or that task.  Coase then posed the following question:

"Having regard to the fact that if production is regulated by price movements, production could be carried on without any organization [that is, without any firms] at all, well might we ask; Why is there any organization?"

When Coase posed this question in 1937, economists universally identified two, and only two, possible reasons for complete vertical integration in a decentralized market economy.  First, such integration could create technological efficiencies and thus reduce production costs.  The classic example of such technologically-induced integration was the combination of iron production and steel manufacture under single ownership.  See George J. Stigler, The Extent and Bases of Monopoly, 32 Amer. Econ. Rev. 1, 22 (1942) (referring to the "hot strip mill" as the "stock example" of "technological economies" that can result from vertical integration).  Such a combination, it was said, would avoid the cost of reheating iron ingot before transforming that ingot into steel.     Second, forward or backward integration could foreclose rivals from important  sources of inputs, thereby creating or fortifying the integrating party's market power.  See Stigler, Extent and Bases of Monopoly, 32 Amer. Econ. Rev. at 22. 

 

Coase offered a completely different explanation for vertical integration and thus the existence of firms.  According to Coase, reliance upon the decentralized market to conduct economic activity was not costless, contrary to what economists generally assumed in their static models.   See Coase, Nature of the Firm, 4 Economica at 390, n. 4 (noting that "static theory" assumes that all prices are known to everyone but that "this is clearly not true of the real world").  Instead, such reliance entailed various costs of arranging and consumating a transaction, what economists would later call "transaction costs."  See Coase, Nature of the Firm, 4 Economica at 390 ("The main reason why it is profitable to establish a firm would seem to be that there is a cost of using the price mechanism.")    According to Coase, such costs included the costs of discovering the prices of various inputs as well as the cost of negotiating with the input's owner over the terms of sale, including, for instance, wages and other terms governing contracts for labor.   By integrating vertically and thus performing an additional task itself, then, a firm could avoid such transaction costs it would otherwise incur.  When it came to individual labor, for instance, vertical integration replaced numerous discrete contracts for labor services with one overall contract, the employment contract, pursuant to which an individual employee agreed to follow the directions of the owner of the firm within certain limits, in return for a fixed wage.      


As Coase noted at the time, this explanation for vertical integration had nothing to do with market power or monopoly considerations. Nor did this explanation depend upon any reduction in technological production costs.  On the contrary, Coase's explanation completely undermined the "technological" account of vertical integration.  After all, absent transaction costs, independent economic actors can, by contract, create any technological combination of labor, capital and other inputs they collectively choose, without integrating vertically.   See Oliver E. Williamson, The Economic Institutions of Capitalism, 86-90 (1985) (explaining why technological considerations cannot explain vertical integration); Victor P. Goldberg, Production Functions and Transaction Costs, 397, in Issues in Contemporary Microeconomics & Welfare (George R. Feiwel, ed. 1985)  (explaining that technical economies cannot explain firm boundaries because, absent transaction costs, such economies can “be achieved equally well [by market contracting] if the factors of production are owned by independent individuals.”).  For instance, assume that making iron and steel in close proximity reduces production costs for the reasons explained above.  If so, then parties can, by contract, agree to locate their production facilities next door to each other, even "under the same roof," without vertical integration that combines such facilities under a single owner.   Thus, there must be some other motive, aside from a desire to operate in close proximity, that induces vertical integration in this setting.  Coase found that motive in transaction costs.  It is no understatement to say, as the Economist did yesterday, that Ronald Coase "explained why firms exist."  (See also e.g. here.)


Coase's argument about the rationale for complete integration also inspired others who were seeking explanations for partial contractual integration.  During the 1960s, for instance, Robert Bork relied upon The Nature of the Firm for the proposition that  "contract integration" and "ownership integration" were economically identical phenomena, both of which could reduce the costs of relying upon atomistic markets to distribute a manufacturer's product.   See Robert H. Bork, The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept: Price Fixing and Market Division, 75 Yale L. J. 383 (1966).   (Even before Bork, Lester Telser had argued that minimum resale price maintenance could encourage dealers to engage in optimal promotion of a manufacturer's product, by preventing dealers from free riding on the promotional expenditures of their fellow dealers.  See Lester G. Telser, Why Do Manufacturers Want Fair Trade?, 3 J. Law & Economics 86 (1960).  Unlike Bork, however, Telser did not cite Coase.)  For instance, Bork argued that vertically-imposed exclusive territories and exclusive territories ancillary to the formation of a joint venture could encourage promotional expenditures by dealers and joint venture partners by ensuring that each party could recapture the benefits of such expenditures.  

Subsequently other scholars, including Oliver Williamson and Benjamin Klein, would also identify transaction cost rationales for partial integration.   Such work also expanded the definition of "transaction costs" that could give rise to both partial and complete integration.  While Coase had focused on the cost of discerning prices and negotiating and memorializing agreements, costs analogous to technological production costs, these other scholars called attention to the problem of opportunism by trading partners, the risk of which constituted a cost of relying upon the market to conduct economic activity.  See generally Benjamin Klein, Transaction Cost Determinants of "Unfair" Contractual Arrangements, 70 American Economic Review 356 (1980); Benjamin Klein, Robert Crawford and Armen Alchian, Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents and the Competitive Contracting Process, 21 J. L. & Econ. 297 (1978); Oliver E. Williamson, Markets and Hierarchies (1975).   See also Bork, Price Fixing and Market Division, 75 Yale L. J. at 382  (characterizing dealer free riding as "parasitical" conduct that "victimized" fellow venturers by "appropriating" to [the free rider] the contributions of other members of the group").   
 

Coase's 1960 work, the Problem of Social Cost, was equally revolutionary.   Before 1960, economists often asserted that market failure in the form of externalities could co-exist with perfect competition.  In 1957, for instance, future Nobel Laureate George Stigler opined that perfect competition would result in an optimal allocation of resources, unless there were positive or negative externalities which, according to Stigler, "the competitive individual ignores." See George J. Stigler, Perfect Competition, Historically Contemplated, 65 J. Pol. Econ. 1, 16-17 (1957).  More than two decades earlier, Arthur Cecil Pigou had similarly contended that externalities could persist in a world of "simple competition."  See  A.C. Pigou, The Economics of Welfare (1932).   Moreover, economists uniformly believed that some form of government intervention was necessary to correct such externalities.   Where "negative" externalities were concerned, such intervention could include so-called "Pigouvian taxes," or traditional "command and control" regulation. Where "positive externalities" were involved, such intervention could include state ownership, subsidies, and/or altering background rules so as to better specify and protect property rights.

The Problem of Social Cost debunked this universal consensus, altering how economists and others think about externalities and market failure.  In particular, Coase demonstrated that "market failure" is not an absolute or exogenous condition but instead depends upon the presence of transaction costs.  Indeed, Coase demonstrated that, in a world with no transaction costs, private parties --- what Stigler had called "the competitive individual" --- would internalize such externalities by bargaining, thereby eliminating any market failure.  (Coase also explained how some externalities do not result in market failure, given that the value of the activity producing the externality could exceed the resulting harm.  In such cases, internalizing the cost of harm via bargaining or otherwise will not alter the activity.)   This insight gave rise to what Stigler would later call the "Coase Theorem," i.e., that "under perfect competition, private and social costs will be equal."      See  George J. Stigler, The Theory of Price 133 (4th Edition 1966).

To be sure, as Coase himself recognized, transaction costs are never completely absent in the real world.  Still, such costs are often low enough that parties can negotiate to overcome a market failure that would otherwise result from an initial allocation and definition of legal entitlements.  Business format franchising provides a classic example of such bargaining.  Instead of creating and then owning franchise outlets itself, the franchisor grants licenses to independent operators, each of whom is thus entitled to operate under the franchisor's trademark.  Franchisors could stop there, allowing each franchisee to operate however he or she pleased.  In the real world, however, granting franchisees such absolute discretion in an unfettered market would result in market failure, as each individual franchisee made product design and quality decisions that would impact other members of the franchise system.  Not surprisingly, then, franchisors often include detailed provisions in contracts granting franchisees the right to operate under the franchise trademark, provisions designed to ensure optimal franchisee investments in quality.  See Paul Rubin, The Theory of the Firm and the Structure of the Franchise Contract, 21 J. Law & Economics 223 (1978).  As Coase would later explain, the legal system can facilitate such contracting by, for instance, making it easier to form contracts that overcome market failure.  See Ronald H. Coase, The Firm, the Market and the Law, 28 in Ronald H. Coase, The Firm, The Market and the Law (1988).

 

Taken together, Coase's work had obvious implications for numerous fields of legal study, including "common law" subjects such as Contract, Property and Tort, as well as statutory subjects such as Corporations and Antitrust.   For instance, Coase's assertion that the business firm is a particular type of contract inspired scholars to model corporations and other firms as a "nexus of contracts," the creation and maintenance of which the State could  facilitate by promulgating enabling corporate law consisting of mainly default rules that parties to the corporate contract could alter by satisfying formal requirements, such as shareholder vote.    See Frank H. Easterbrook and Daniel Fischel, The Economic Structure of Corporate Law (1991). 

 

Transaction cost economics also had a profound impact on antitrust law and policy.  During the 1950s and 1960s, courts articulating antitrust doctrine became increasingly hostile to various forms of complete and partial integration.  Such hostility followed naturally from the dominant economic account of the causes and consequences of such integration.  As noted earlier, economists believed that the only benefits of vertical integration were technological in nature. These supposed benefits naturally arose "within" the firm, as part of the process of production.  Thus, when economists, or, for that matter, antitrust courts or enforcement agencies, could not identify any efficiency purposes for such integration, they naturally inferred that the conduct was an anticompetitive effort  to obtain or protect market power.  Hostility toward partial contractual integration such as minimum and maximum resale price maintenance, tying, exclusive dealing, exclusive territories and exclusive supply contracts was particularly intense.  After all, such agreements reached beyond the firm, controlling the activities of trading partners before a firm took title to inputs or after a firm relinquished title by selling a finished product.  As a result, there were simply no apparent efficiency purposes of such agreements, which reduced rivalry of one form or another and thus reduced competition without any offsetting benefits.   The result was the so-called "inhospitality tradition" of antitrust law, pursuant to which the Supreme Court condemned vertical mergers in unconcentrated markets under Section 7 of the Clayton Act as well as  various forms of partial integration as unlawful per se or nearly so under Section 1 of the Sherman Act.


However, the work of Bork, Telser, Williamson, Klein and others completely undermined the economic premises of the inhospitality tradition, by explaining how complete and partial integration were often voluntary methods of overcoming market failures and thus producing non-technological efficiencies. See Oliver E. Williamson, The Economic Institutions of Capitalism, 28 (1985) (articulating rebuttable presumption that partial and complete integration has transaction cost origins).  See also here, explaining Bork's contributions in this regard.  Thus, beginning with Continental T.V. v. GTE Sylvania, 433 U.S. 36 (1977), the Supreme Court has repudiated or narrowed  several per se rules announced during the inhospitality era.  At the same time, the antitrust enforcement agencies have reversed their previous hostility to vertical mergers, and lower courts have uniformly adopted a more friendly stance to such transactions. Society's economic welfare has increased significantly as a result, thanks in large part to Ronald Coase.  Society is richer, literally, as a result.